At the beginning of the war, while the shock from October 7 was still in the air, a decision was made that received public support at the time: everyone would remain in their positions. At that critical moment, the need to maintain functionality outweighed the need to hold those responsible accountable. The prime minister, government ministers, chief of staff, head of military intelligence, and the chain of command under them all remained the same in order to lead the military campaign.
At the time, it was a crucial decision, but it was accompanied by a problematic legacy: the debate over responsibility for the failure continues to be managed from one’s seat. The background noise of direct and implied accusations began immediately after October 7. As the public discourse returns to the lines of October 6, it becomes more central and increasingly partisan—under the code names of “the political level” and “the military level.”
This creates a false impression that responsibility is a zero-sum game, a kind of pie chart that needs to be divided between two or more sides to determine the hierarchy of blame. But responsibility, by its very nature, is not divisible. It is always complete and always absolute. Whoever is responsible is responsible, regardless of anyone else’s role. The failures of others neither elevate nor diminish that.
The hours, days, weeks, and years leading up to October 7 must be examined from all angles—in inquiry committees, internal reviews, books, films, articles, and discussions that will accompany Israel for decades to come. This is a painful but necessary process in order to understand the mechanics of the failure and to draw conclusions about the individuals, institutions, and norms that allowed it to happen. However, there are also clear truths that do not require any investigative committee.
These are:
• IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, like his predecessors in the role, failed to understand the threat posed by Hamas. Even based on his limited understanding and the information available to him, he did not act decisively enough on the night of October 6.
• In his last term, despite warnings about the possibility of war (which likely did not focus on Gaza), Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not engage significantly in the security domain.
• The intelligence community— the research divisions of the Military Intelligence Directorate and the Shin Bet—failed to understand Hamas’ intentions, despite intelligence materials that were gathered, and did not provide relevant warning about the attack in real time.
• The IDF’s deployment at the Gaza border, as managed by both the political and military leadership, was not sufficient for the threat posed by Hamas.
There are many more complexities and nuances that need to be added to the picture, but these are facts that are not in dispute.
There’s a large focus on the personalities of Netanyahu and Halevi, but that isn’t important. Whether these men were arrogant or humble, responsible or narcissistic, moral or opportunistic, the failure lies not in the individuals themselves but in the role they took upon themselves—protecting Israel’s security. It is a heavy and thankless role that few are willing to undertake. But they accepted it, and unfortunately, they did not fulfill it.
It’s important to clarify: there is a collective reckoning that everyone is implicated in. Many of us—military personnel, politicians, and the general public—held the flawed worldview that allowed October 7 to happen. However, the accountability of those at the top of the systems is different. The general public must be critical, but ultimately they consume the worldview that these leaders create. Posts on Facebook and the public discourse may blur this, but there is a chasm between the leaders, who are exposed to information, make decisions, and shape the arena, and the general public.
However, it seems that the perspective of time only blurs the picture on this issue. In light of the horror of October 7, a deep public sentiment has emerged, stating that life cannot simply return to normal. The retreat from this sentiment reflects more than anything the difficulty of confronting that horror, that moment of profound existential fear, and drawing the necessary conclusion: what came before has failed. One can discuss the timing, but it must lead to dismissals, elections, and an investigation.
This article was translated from Hebrew by Nancye Kochen.
