One cannot understand the events of October 7, 2023, without recognizing the broader changes sweeping across the world. This was the argument made by security researchers Einat Gefner-Goldstein and Amichai Danino in an interview with Davar on the eve of the most recent Independence Day. “The world order is shifting, and it’s not just Trump,” Danino said. “This is going to shake the world and our lives, and it will significantly impact Israeli security policy as well.”
The researchers propose a simple idea: contrary to the dominant stance in Israel during the country’s early decades, when decision-making was paramount, Israel in recent decades has become addicted to a strategy of containment. What this has done to the Israeli mindset, the two argue, is create conceptual paralysis and a persistent striving for the status quo. It’s not just about Qatari funds, but rather a general conception that to maintain the security of the state, everything must be done to keep things as they are. No leader has been more faithful to this approach than Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—not only in the security realm.
It may be hard to recall now, but the long Netanyahu era—which began in 1996, two years after the Second Lebanon War, and continued, with a brief break, until today—was characterized, until the COVID-19 pandemic, by routine and growth that closely matched the foundational principles of his leadership, which sought to change and shift as little as possible.
Netanyahu tends to avoid bold decisions and stand aside during crises. This is how he continued the Oslo Accords initiated by his predecessors; how he was dragged into military operations; and how he allowed Justice Minister Yariv Levin and Constitution Committee Chair Simcha Rothman to lead the judicial reform. The only exception was during his tenure as Finance Minister in the 2000s, when he led harsh budget cuts that harmed the poor and the public sector—a move that cost him dearly in elections.
Criticism of Netanyahu’s passivity and policy of avoiding decisions is not new. Some view it as a conservative virtue, especially at points of conflict, where he is often identified with the dovish and restrained side. But the events of recent weeks—most notably the complete disregard by US President Donald Trump toward Israel during his historic visit to the Middle East; the UK and European Union’s calls for a full economic boycott of Israel; and what appears to be at least a psychological preparation for a scenario in which the US no longer backs Israel militarily and diplomatically—shed new light on the problems inherent in his worldview, and more importantly, in Netanyahu’s policy.
To better understand what’s new in today’s news, one must examine Trump’s actions, as Gefner-Goldstein and Danino suggest, against the backdrop of the Chinese threat to the US. Trump, they believe, is prepared to go a long and difficult road that includes building nuclear reactors and transferring advanced weaponry and fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey; completely lifting sanctions on Syria; and reaching heavy compromises with Iran—all in order to stabilize a strong front against China.
Even Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine—which has minimal, if any, economic and political consequences for the US—should, they argue, be understood in relation to China: Trump may personally like Russian President Vladimir Putin due to their similarities, but the story is bigger than personality. Trump wants Russia, which is currently highly dependent on China, to be on his side when the time comes. Or at least, as in the Iranian case, not entirely against him.
Israel’s place in this fast-paced and confusing development is growing more obscure by the day. The global trade map is being redrawn, there are intense diplomatic efforts to end the war in Europe and rebuild the US-Arab alliance system, and Israel is losing its primacy in regional attention. The numbers speak for themselves. Trump’s three-day visit to the region yielded framework agreements for future joint investments in technology and artificial intelligence between the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar totaling more than $3 trillion—almost six times Israel’s total GDP for 2024. Even without political harm to Israel’s trade relations with the world, these figures are no longer trivial and cast a huge shadow over Israel’s future as the Middle East’s technological jewel—with all the economic, diplomatic, and security implications that entails.
Aside from the objective security reasons—Hamas’ commitment to eternal warfare, its refusal to disarm, and its holding of hostages—it seems the war in Gaza continues mainly out of Netanyahu’s belief that strength must be projected at all costs. The “total victory” campaign is more a psychological marketing slogan than an operational plan aimed at improving Israeli civilian security.
This value-based outlook, alongside coalition pressure that could jeopardize his continued rule, has become the main obstacle preventing Netanyahu’s government from seeing reality in all its complexity—and especially its changes. There’s little that can be done about the external circumstances Israel has found itself in, but when it comes to internal ones, it is again Netanyahu’s change-averse leadership that tips the balance.
Israel is at an unprecedented low: not only the significant portion of the public—polling between 60% and 80%—calling to end the war for a hostage deal, but also the reserve enlistment rates, ranging from 50% to 70%. The numbers may be disputed, partly because the military does not publish clear and transparent data, but the economic, familial, and psychological burden on fathers in young families who have done more than 300 days of reserve duty in the past year and a half is a fact even the staunchest supporters of the war cannot deny.
In recent weeks, there has also been a protest by parents against the army’s policy of sending increasing numbers of new, inadequately trained soldiers into Gaza. The reason is clear to all—refusal to enlist Israel’s ultra-Orthodox population—and despite the noise and faint criticism heard even within the coalition, it is clear that Netanyahu does not intend to change direction and tackle that core problem. This, of course, will only worsen the current reserve system. Thus, even when it seems the moment has come to resolve the issue once and for all—once again, what was is what will be.
The recent teachers’ protest also highlighted the war’s toll on the public sector and its most neglected parts. Millions of other workers have been harmed as well, all under the banner of an economic policy that refuses to acknowledge the massive change the war has brought and insists on continued cuts. International boycotts, the dissolution of bilateral agreements, and the severing of ties with key international partners will not benefit Israeli growth—and in the worst-case scenario, may lead to massive capital flight, mass layoffs, and further cuts.
The call to end the war, even if not agreed upon at the moral or ethical level, is an attempt to bring current affairs into some order. The only way to move past the question “Are they for or against Israel?” is to assess Israel’s situation in the context of the massive global events taking place today, unlike anything since the end of World War II.
Netanyahu does not act in a vacuum, Gefner-Goldstein and Danino argue. In their article “From Containment to Spatial Design—A Proposal for Rethinking a Central Principle in National Security Doctrine,” they show how Netanyahu’s containment strategy fit well with the post-Cold War Western reality over the past 30 years: “Israel chose to focus on economic growth and quality of life, which require calm and stability. This concept aligned with the liberal world order, which worked to preserve the international status quo as the basis for economic growth.”
The pursuit of economic, security, and diplomatic arrangements instead of forceful resolutions fit well in a unipolar, growing, and interconnected world—but that world no longer exists. The Arab engine of the Gulf, set to take the lead in regional leadership for years to come and redefine the Israeli-American-Gulf dependency mechanism, demands an end to the war in Gaza as a sole condition for continuing its relationship with Israel. Leaders of European countries—Israel’s key trade partners—are under threat from waves of refugees, the meteoric rise of reactionary parties, demographic shifts, and a hot war in the east of the continent. They’re longer interested in tolerating the Israeli war in Gaza and the many problems it causes them. This time, they appear ready to insist on an end to the war. The US, facing its own challenges, is forming a similar bipartisan stance on the matter.
Some Israelis may find truth in the world’s claims about Gazan suffering and the demand to end the war; others may see hypocrisy. It doesn’t change the fact that Israel can no longer continue “as if nothing else matters.” The world is changing—and that is the central reason why Netanyahu’s unchanging leadership is so dangerous.
