“The Iranian nuclear program was born before the Ayatollahs’ revolution. It enjoys a broad consensus in Iranian society,” Danny Citrinowicz, a senior researcher in the Iran and Shiite Axis program at the Institute for National Security Studies, told Davar in an interview. “It has existed since the days of the pro-Western rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was overthrown in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.”
Citrinowicz, who has studied Iran for decades, explained that the shah viewed nuclear development as a tool to advance the regime’s status. This fact, in his view, highlights the central place the program holds not only in the eyes of the regime but also within Iranian society. “It has broad consensus, a symbol of pride, a basic right. Even a regime change in Iran would not necessarily mean abandoning the nuclear program.”
Citrinowicz identified the shift in the regime’s policy toward military nuclear objectives as beginning under the current supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who rose to power in the early 1990s. During that time, amid the Iran-Iraq War and the First Gulf War, the pursuit of nuclear weapons was seen as key to the regime’s survival, particularly due to fears of an American invasion.
The program’s early days relied on assistance from Pakistan, itself a nuclear power, which supplied Iran with its first centrifuges. Later, Russian expertise helped the Iranians learn how to assemble bombs. Until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the regime had a dedicated nuclear weapons program (Project Amad), but it was reportedly abandoned, likely out of fear it would become a target for the US, as well as due to internal resistance.
Davar spoke to Citrinowicz to understand more about Iran’s nuclear program.
Why is the Iranian program considered different from others?
Unlike the Iraqi or Syrian programs, which were concentrated in one place, the Iranian program is decentralized and spread across a large area. Underground uranium enrichment facilities are in the cities of Qom and Natanz, the enriched uranium stockpile is in Isfahan, home to Iran’s largest nuclear fuel repository, and there is a heavy water reactor in Arak. All of these are part of the comprehensive package that makes up Iran’s nuclear program.
What is this larger plan?
Iran knows how to mine or import natural uranium, send it to the processing and conversion facility in Isfahan, prepare the material for centrifuge enrichment in Natanz, and enrich it to 90%. Israel is trying to sabotage this entire chain so that even if Iran has natural uranium, it won’t be able to enrich it.
The New York Times reported that there had been no damage in Isfahan, but that’s inaccurate, because there has indeed been damage to the fuel storage site, a crucial part of the enrichment chain, where the material is prepared for the centrifuge.
Is this entire activity aimed at producing a nuclear bomb?
There are clear indications that in recent years, there have been various scientific projects, not necessarily military. To build a bomb, you need fissile material, obtained by enriching uranium or from plutonium in a nuclear reactor, and then you need to assemble the bomb. It’s a complex process with a clear order of operations: First, you acquire the fissile material, then build the system to extract it, and only then can you begin constructing the bomb.
Is eliminating scientists a setback to the program?
Iran has a large cadre of scientists who know how to develop and manage the program. Iran currently maintains full technological, logistical, and research independence across all branches of its nuclear programs. There is no single knowledge center.
The knowledge that is harder to reproduce is the transition from material to weapon, turning fissile material into a weapon. A select and elite group of scientists holds this knowledge, and they were the main targets of Israeli operations. That is, beyond damaging enrichment technology, there has also been a hit to the production chain that turns material into weapons, primarily the knowledge and experience of the scientists.
It’s a significant setback, and it will take time to recover, but it’s possible.
How can we even know how close Iran is to building a bomb?
There are two dimensions to the information. First, Iran’s nuclear facilities are under international inspection, which provides information about their enrichment status. Beyond that, any insight Israel has into weaponization processes comes from intensive intelligence efforts.
Now, Iran is threatening to withdraw from international agreements, which would reduce the quality and availability of information about enrichment. Maintaining that supervision is in Israel’s interest, and it’s an open question whether it will still be possible after the recent events.
Is it even possible to completely destroy the nuclear program?
In my opinion, that’s a false illusion. You can’t erase knowledge. Facilities can be rebuilt, and the amount of material Iran holds is immense. Maybe they’ve tried to bomb it, but how much of that material can actually be destroyed by bombing?
What really concerns me is the idea of entering into a war of attrition with Iran that could lead to unexpected places. The Iranians are being cornered on an issue they consider fundamental—the right to enrich uranium.
