The war in Yemen is once again taking center stage on the regional agenda. The exchange of blows between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, the decision to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the ousting of Emirati-backed forces, and Israeli concerns about renewed attacks on Eilat all demonstrate once again that, even if everyone would rather forget about Yemen, it is always there to remind them.
“The previous round of internal changes in Yemen took place in December and January,” Inbal Nissim-Louvton, a Yemen researcher at the Open University and Tel Aviv University’s Dayan Center, tells Davar. Nissim-Louvton describes the developments that shook Yemen in the months preceding the current round of fighting between Iran and the United States: the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist faction backed by the United Arab Emirates, launched a surprise offensive and seized large areas of southern Yemen, including the oil-rich Hadramawt governorate and the city of Aden.
In response, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on weapons shipments from the UAE that were destined for the STC, forcing the Emiratis to withdraw all support for their proxy. Yemeni government forces, backed by Saudi Arabia, launched a swift counteroffensive, retook the territory, and ultimately led to the dissolution of the STC, the flight of its leader, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, and the UAE’s withdrawal from the Yemeni arena.
Turbulence in the South: The UAE Out, the Recognized Government In
The campaign restored control of southern Yemen to the Yemeni government recognized by the international community, as well as over almost all territory not controlled by the Houthis. However, it left the government economically weakened and internally divided. By contrast, the Houthi authorities in the north maintained their military and political stability.
This stability, and the Houthis’ relative strengthening, may have been among the factors behind Sanaa’s initial reluctance to join the 2026 Iran war, known in Tehran as “Operation True Promise 4.” But pressure from Iran intensified, and several developments beginning in April eventually led to a shift.
“A small tribal rebellion in Houthi-controlled territory gained momentum,” Nissim-Louvton explains, “probably with the help of the Muslim Brotherhood, and perhaps the Saudis as well. It started as a relatively minor incident involving a sheikh from the Dahm tribe, who fled Houthi-controlled territory after being arrested twice and released. He then settled along a major route used to transport large quantities of goods into and out of Houthi territory.
“His arrests and testimony about the torture he experienced in a Houthi prison prompted some members of the Dahm tribes to take up arms independently and establish a military camp along the route that the Houthis had been using to transport large quantities of goods.”
The Fleeing Sheikh and the Deadliest Incident Since 2022
The incident intensified tensions that had already existed between tribal leaders and the Houthi authorities, reigniting clashes between the Houthis and other Yemeni forces—fighting that had been relatively rare since the 2022 ceasefire.
In July, the Houthis launched a surprise attack on Yemeni army soldiers near Jabal Dabbas, south of the strategic port city of Hodeidah. According to the Yemeni government, the Houthis killed 16 Yemeni soldiers in the attack, while several dozen Houthi fighters were also killed. The incident was the deadliest since the 2022 ceasefire.
And where does Saudi Arabia come into the picture?
“The Saudis stopped paying the salaries of civil servants in Houthi-controlled territory. They say they will only resume payments if a proper mechanism is put in place to ensure that the money reaches government employees and not the Houthis. The Houthis hold the Saudis responsible for paying the salaries, based on their claim that Saudi Arabia is responsible for Yemen’s situation: that it has prevented Yemenis from accessing oil and mineral resources, and because of the naval and air blockade it imposes on them—and, according to the Houthis, on all of Yemen.”
What about Iran?
“Iran also has a role in the escalation. It is pushing the Houthis to join it in the war. As Hezbollah has weakened and Iran has lost much of its capabilities, it has increased the pressure on the Houthis. In July, for the first time in years, we saw flights between Iran and Houthi-controlled territory. This is something they had not dared to do before, and it prompted Saudi Arabia to bomb Sanaa International Airport.”
So can we declare the April 2022 ceasefire over?
“The events of July signal the end of the ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized Yemeni government, on the one hand, and the Houthis, on the other. The potential outcome is not only a resumption of the civil war inside Yemen, but a much broader campaign. This is a major development because the war there between 2014 and 2022 was a major force shaping the Middle East, and it also caused immense suffering and loss of life.”
Blockade Under Blockade: Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Trap
According to Nissim-Louvton, the Houthis frame everything as part of what they call “the campaign to break the air and sea blockade.”
“For them, the principle is an eye for an eye. A blockade will be met with a blockade. An attack on an airport will be met with an attack on an airport. That is why they closed the Bab al-Mandab Strait, attacked the Saudi port of Yanbu, and blocked Saudi Arabia’s trade routes to the east.”
In the new reality that has emerged, Saudi Arabia is trapped. Its eastern coastline along the Persian Gulf is cut off by the Strait of Hormuz, while its western coastline along the Red Sea is cut off by the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The only shipping route left to it is through the Suez Canal, making trade with countries to the east, above all India and China, more difficult.
“A Low Flame, But Ready to Ignite”: The Houthi Threat to Eilat
Nissim-Louvton believes that in the next round of fighting between Iran and the United States, the Houthis will not hesitate to bring Israel into the circle of attacks. From their perspective, they are part of the Axis of Resistance and are always prepared to launch missiles at Israel.
Their propaganda strategy is to keep the conflict with Israel burning at a low enough level that they retain the option of delaying an attack if they choose to, but high enough to provide justification for launching missiles at Israel.
Is the dynamic between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis similar to the dynamic between Iran and the United States?
“It is similar in the sense of taking one step forward and two steps back, but each of these wars is a conflict in its own right. The situations are certainly interconnected, but from the Houthis’ perspective, they always want to demonstrate that they make their own decisions. There is no doubt that they draw inspiration from Iran. For example, they have been talking for several months about imposing a tax on traffic through the Bab al-Mandab Strait.”
Taxes at Bab al-Mandab? Like the ones Iran wants to impose in the Strait of Hormuz?
“They say that Yemeni politicians in the past were afraid to stand up and demand what they were entitled to. Now they will demand it. ‘It’s time we take what belongs to us.’ They tie this to the narrative of the Saudis’ great oil theft. They make extensive use of patriotic, nationalist rhetoric centered on the struggle against exploitation and corruption, which is rooted in a religious discourse. They always combine Shiite religious rhetoric with Yemeni national patriotism—complementary ideologies.”
Where do the Emiratis come into the picture?
“The Emiratis have scaled back their involvement in Yemen and are investing in other projects instead, but the leaders of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) are still based in the UAE. I wouldn’t be so quick to write them off. The Saudis have created an alternative southern movement, trying to show that they are attentive to the southern issue and make the coalition against the Houthis more effective. But in the process, they are driving a wedge between the southern tribes. Members of the Southern Transitional Council continue to speak out against the Saudis on social media, trying to delegitimize them. These struggles weaken the tribes that could provide an alternative to Houthi rule.”
And what about Iran? Is it pressuring them to attack Israel?
“Iran is in an uncomfortable position, and Hezbollah has been weakened, so the Houthis and the militias in Iraq are currently its main reserve forces. But we know that the Houthis are not a classic proxy. They are independent and have their own priorities.
“I think Iran would have been happy to see them join the fighting earlier; it could have had a stronger impact during the war. Their first involvement came a month after the war began, when they launched missiles at Eilat. There was another attack in early April, and that was it. They linked that attack to the 11th anniversary of their war against the Saudi-led coalition. They connect all the narratives. They say that just as the Yemenis have stood firm against the aggression of America and its Saudi allies, so too have the Palestinians and Lebanon stood against Israel. They connect the dots, but the local context always comes first—the Houthis in Yemen.”