“Rethinking What Force Can Achieve”: The Article Proposing a Change in Israel’s Military Strategy

For many Israelis, the war that began with the Hamas attack three years ago and has since expanded throughout the Middle East seems unwilling to end. In the article “Queen of the Jungle? On the Role of Israel’s Military Power in Establishing a New Regional Order in the Middle East“, Brig. Gen. Dr. Eyal Pecht, former commander of the Dado Center, and Lt. Col. Dr. Itay Haiminis, a senior researcher at the institute, point to the possibility that this stems from tectonic regional and global changes that require Israel to rethink its national security doctrine.

The article published about six months ago in the military journal Bein HaKatavim ("Between the Poles") sparked debate primarily within professional circles, but it sheds light on deep-seated processes impacting life here and now, as well as the future of Israel. In an interview with Davar, Dr. Itay Haiminis explains the analysis of reality that led to writing the article, and the desired directions of change, which also stirred opposition among some readers.

Let’s start with the bottom line: many Israelis expect that once the war ends, life will return to the way it was before. In contrast, you argue in the article that we must internalize the fact that Israel is entering a state of prolonged military conflict—and furthermore, that we should not shy away from this.

"Yes, that’s accurate."

Why? We’ve had the Swords of Iron War, a war in Lebanon, and two rounds of conflict with Iran. Why not just have a ceasefire and bring it all to an end?

"That statement is, first and foremost, an assessment of the current situation. It is important to distinguish it from other approaches suggesting that everything could be ended immediately—whether by employing greater military force or by reaching diplomatic settlements. Such approaches were prevalent a few years ago, but in our view, they are less applicable to current circumstances.

"This shift stems primarily from changes in our environment. There are far more threats, and they are far more significant, and they cannot be resolved through a quick military victory or a rapid diplomatic settlement. This compels us to keep fighting until we achieve a better security situation."

Is a reality of security tensions and escalations what you foresee for the coming years?

"If there is one thing we have learned in recent years, it is that the ability to predict the future is very limited. Based on current events and past developments, we are contending with a hostile entity that seeks our destruction. It had a plan for our annihilation and intended to carry it out. Under these circumstances, and as long as the enemy does not decide to alter its policy, friction is inevitable.

"We are facing what we termed 'revolutionary actors' in the article—a definition coined by statesman Henry Kissinger. These actors do not accept the existing order or the processes of integration and normalization taking place in the region. As long as they refuse to accept Israel’s existence and these processes, we will have to continue fighting them. We assess, as Kissinger noted, that while such actors may occasionally resort to diplomatic channels, this is not a means to resolve the conflict; rather, it is a way to buy time and gain legitimacy. Ultimately, it is part of a grand strategy designed to upend the regional order and oust Israel from the region."

"The Iranians perceive a shift in the global order."

So, if there is no diplomatic path, are we condemned to endless war?

"Military force is inevitable given the nature of these adversaries—Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. They are unwilling to accept the existing order. Perhaps, at a moment of weakness, they might agree to our terms, but it would always be temporary, unless there is a fundamental change in the nature of these actors and their worldviews. The historical precedents we cite in the article are relevant: even during periods of truce, the USSR did not abandon its revolutionary ambitions. Similarly, with Egypt, it took a series of confrontations before they opted for a strategic shift and accepted our existence. Under current circumstances, we view Israel's military power as a means to shape a security reality that is more favorable to Israel."

Revolutionary forces have been around us for a long time. Hamas and Hezbollah have been here for a long time. What changed? Did they simply build up enough strength? 

"To answer the question of what changed, one must zoom out to a broader global shift. I think the Iranians and their allies identify a shift in the global order, a decline in Western power relative to the East. They view this as a shift in their favor, and an opportunity to achieve their long-term goals—chief among them becoming the regional hegemon, driving the US out of the region, and destroying Israel. "A few years ago, there was a very interesting conference in Iran whose main points were translated by Dr. Raz Zimmt, in which a series of speakers from the military and political leadership spoke about the unique historical potential for Iran at the current time. To this, one can add operational lessons they derive from other conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, and the shift in the nature of military conflicts in general. These things together lead them to identify an opportunity. It doesn't matter whether their analysis is correct, they are acting on it."

How does this fit into the global shift?

"In the article, we talk about a transition from a neoliberal order to a neo-mercantilist order (the rise of state power relative to the global market). The biggest change in this respect is that war is returning to the center of national life in Israel and other countries. Empirically as well—the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London found that 2023 was the most intense year globally in terms of inter-state military conflicts since the end of the Cold War. 

"For us Israelis, we enjoyed what was called a golden age of security over the past few decades. This was a period with many conflicts beyond our borders, but war was not a central part of our national existence. Now it has returned, partly due to the unique Middle Eastern context, but it is also part of a broader global phenomenon.” 

"Once you understand this, you can put additional shifts into a broader context, such as the changing nature of warfare itself. The duration of the latest war is not unique to Israel. We are seeing long wars across the globe. The balance between security considerations and economic considerations is shifting, and national security considerations are gaining far greater weight."

So "the day after" will not actually be a return to October 6th? 

"No. Reality has genuinely changed on many levels. This is evident everywhere in the world. The global economic order is different, and the regional balance of power has shifted. We are talking about an intensity of threat that we have not faced before. And we as a country are changing because of the return of war. In the past, people talked about concepts like post-heroic warfare, an unwillingness to make sacrifices, and the decline of patriotic sentiments. These concepts are becoming less relevant, both in Israel and in other places around the world."

Eliminating Threats or Reshaping Reality

The classic Israeli security concept says that Israel should not try to solve problems through force, but rather maintain a defensive concept. You need an iron wall, pushing back rounds of conflict, holding out long enough so they understand we aren't going anywhere—which might create an opening for something else. What needs to change? 

"It's a complex question; I'll explain what is already changing. The element of prevention, which has always existed, has taken on a far more significant place in our military strategy. So have concepts of enforcing a regional order, and coercion through force, a decisive approach to the application of force. Everything existed in Israeli military thought, but the balance between these and other components has shifted in a way that highlights these terms, which better explain how we operate in the region, primarily because of how circumstances around us have changed."

In the article itself, Pecht and Dr. Haiminis list seven components of the Israeli security concept and describe how their application and weight have shifted in recent years. Among other things, they point to the increased use of coercion:forcing a change in behavior through the use of force, and prevention: targeting the enemy's force buildup before it takes offensive action, thereby degrading its capabilities. Conversely, they note the declining weight of warning and deterrence—components that are better suited to an approach centered on maintaining the status quo and avoiding friction.

You address the components, but there is a fundamental shift regarding the question of the goals of military force. One could say that ultimately, the goal of applying force is to remove threats, a minimalist approach. On the other hand, one could say the goal of applying force is to reshape the Middle East.

"The purpose of military force is still, first and foremost, to remove threats and defend. But the major change we have seen, which began in recent years and accelerated during the war, is that military force also has a role in shaping the foundations of the regional order. This is a more ambitious role than in the past, not just to remove threats, but also to build something better—meaning a positive, constructive role as well."

"It's important to say that this is a long-term process, which was accelerated by the war but began before it. For example, force played an important role in the region's integration processes under the Abraham Accords, and it also played an important role in establishing relations with the US several decades ago. For a long time now, it has served to create a better reality. It isn't the only tool—there are also many non-military tools that are critical. But the relationship and balance between them have changed."

The question is what the boundaries of this are. One could develop an imperialist superpower mindset and start using force to achieve all sorts of goals—economic goals, for example, like the US. What are the limits?

"The Zionist narrative of building a state and focusing on its growth remains valid; the cost, however, has risen. It now requires far greater investment, including in military efforts, to ensure that the Zionist project of national fulfillment can continue to unfold in our region.

"For years, we have spoken of crucial normalization and integration processes; these constitute the essence of the new order Israel has sought to establish in recent times. Because the foundations of this order were undermined by the revolutionary bloc led by Iran, we were compelled to enter a protracted war in order to achieve our national objectives."

There is a real danger of intoxication with power—the notion that Israel is an air force and intelligence superpower that can solve every problem using force.

"We do not think that every problem can be solved through military force. We ask whether military force has ripple effects that extend beyond removing threats. Even if the fundamental purpose has not changed, it enables the building of things and the fulfillment of integration and normalization in the region. This must come alongside additional tools, such as economic partnerships, aid, technology, strengthening alliances, and diplomatic and social tools. From the angle of military force, you primarily address threats, but sometimes it affords you the opportunity to realize additional positive national goals."

Demilitarization, Initiative, and Defense Industries

Why did you write the article?

"We wrote the article because there is an ongoing debate regarding this issue. There are voices arguing that the war could be ended right now through a series of arrangements, while others believe that if we were simply willing to use force 'to the very end,' we could resolve our problems. We argue that the changing nature of the region renders both of these approaches unviable.

The article’s primary goal is to spark a systemic and critical discussion. Bein HaKetavim [the magazine where the article appeared] is part of a relatively rich tradition of the military engaging in critical self-examination. This kind of criticism enables us to keep moving forward, even when we feel we have reached an impasse. We have faced a great deal of criticism, some of it scathing, and we welcome it. First and foremost, we wanted to stimulate dialogue, and to a large extent, that is exactly what happened.

"To initiate a conceptual shift, one must begin, above all, by transforming the realm of ideas, and only then adapting the tools. Once your conceptual mindset changes, you are able to implement the necessary conceptual shifts."

In the article, Pecht and Dr. Haiminis point to several directions for strategic shifts that the IDF must undergo in the coming years. Alongside conceptual and organizational changes, they propose establishing new objectives for the application of force—among them the demilitarization of border-adjacent areas, preventing enemy entrenchment along Israel's borders, preserving freedom of movement and trade in the Middle East, and preventing the emergence of an existential threat from Syria. In addition to these, significant weight is given to the topic of defense industries, and to what Dr. Haiminis calls an "industrial policy directed toward supreme national security goals."

How do you view the necessary shift in industrial policy? 

"The change is already happening. The defense industry is adapting to the new circumstances, becoming more independent and less reliant on outside parties. This is part of a global trend toward self-reliance. Many Western countries realize that supply chains are far more fragile, not just because of wars, but also due to COVID-19 and climate issues. States are returning to a more proactive and active role."

The Challenge of Change

In conclusion, what is the single biggest danger you see right now? 

"The greatest danger is that we fail to contend with military threats, both existing and emerging. We are genuinely facing a significant existential threat. We face a very substantial challenge to adapt, rapidly and relevantly, that will allow us to remain the leading military force in the region. "As a researcher of military adaptation, I know it is always a difficult task; it always involves a fierce and heated debate that must be sparked and sustained. It always demands a conceptual and organizational shift, and there are always opponents. This holds true for any organization, but change is essential for the sake of national security. It is not a privilege—as noted, it is an existential matter."