A new series of revelations, which began with the publication of a Haaretz investigation about three weeks ago, sheds light on significant events that took place in the days leading up to October 7. Contrary to some of the headlines, it is still unclear whether a concrete warning about Hamas’s surprise attack was conveyed to Netanyahu and the security establishment. At the same time, the reports reveal the depth of the prevailing assumptions within the political and security establishment, and how Hamas’s deception operation completely blinded Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s version of events—that he sought to pursue a more aggressive policy than the one proposed by the security establishment—has also, for the time being, been disproven.
What Was Revealed?
In brief, these are the new details added by the reports about the days leading up to the massacre:
- Haaretz: Former senior Fatah official Sufian Abu Zaida, referred to in the investigation as “Coal Eyes,” received a direct message dictated to him by Sinwar, stating that “Israel should expect an ‘earthquake’.The message was conveyed to Mohammed bin Zayed, the President of the United Arab Emirates, who passed it on to Israel through two channels: to the head of the Shin Bet on September 15, and in a direct 45-minute conversation with Netanyahu on an encrypted phone at the end of the month. The Prime Minister’s Office completely denied that the conversation took place. According to the investigation, Netanyahu did not pass the information on to the security establishment.
- Kan 11: Several months after the massacre, bin Zayed spoke with the CIA director about the warning he had given Netanyahu. According to the report, it was a general warning about the possibility of a violent outbreak.
- Channel 12 News: The conversation between bin Zayed and Netanyahu was intended to ensure that the prime minister had received the information and that the matter was being addressed.
- New York Times: Sources confirmed to the newspaper that the conversation between bin Zayed and Netanyahu took place, during which he said that “Hamas is considering a major attack.” It was unclear whether this referred to a missile attack or a ground offensive. Former senior security officials told the newspaper that Netanyahu did not pass the message on. At a meeting on Gaza held on October 1, the warning was not mentioned, according to minutes of the meeting obtained by the newspaper. The minutes show that Netanyahu sought to maintain calm in Gaza, partly out of concern that an escalation would harm talks with Saudi Arabia, and opposed a proposal to strike senior Hamas figures who were promoting terrorism in the West Bank.
- The Atlantic: Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel arrived in Israel on September 26 on a private plane, specifically to warn of a potential escalation in Gaza. Kamel warned that Hamas was preparing for a significant attack and urged Israel to provide the organization with economic concessions to prevent escalation. It is not known whom exactly he met. According to the investigation, the plane’s arrival at Ben Gurion Airport was verified using flight-tracking data.
- Channel 13 News: Documents from the final situation assessments in the two weeks before the October 7 massacre show that on September 27, Netanyahu was instructed to reduce escalation and expand the use of humanitarian measures, with an emphasis on allowing workers to enter Israel. At the final discussion, held on October 1, the possibility of an agreement with Saudi Arabia was raised, and the Prime Minister’s Office instructed officials to maintain “effective and measured” security activity. The discussion also addressed expanding humanitarian measures and advancing a civilian arrangement with Hamas. According to the documents, Netanyahu’s office instructed officials to prepare to strike senior Hamas figures in accordance with a Shin Bet recommendation, with an emphasis on the official responsible in Gaza for incitement in the West Bank region. However, sources who participated in the discussion told Channel 13 News that Netanyahu ultimately refrained from making a decision on the matter.
In response to the reports, Netanyahu’s office issued, as noted, a sweeping and detailed rebuttal, and even threatened to sue Shlomi Eldar, an Israeli journalist—though no lawsuit has yet been filed. The United Arab Emirates issued a statement saying that it shares security information through the appropriate channels, but did not directly deny that the conversation took place.
Was This “Golden Intelligence”?
According to the reports, the prime minister’s inner circle allegedly received two warnings about the possibility of an attack. But to understand their significance, it is also necessary to examine the context in which they were given and their precise content. At the time, indirect negotiations were underway between Hamas and Israel over economic concessions for Gaza, amid threats of escalation and Hamas-organized riots along the border fence. At the end of September, understandings were reached that led to an increase in the number of workers entering Israel, the entry of Qatari funds, and an end to the unrest.
Documents seized during the war explicitly addressed the deception that preceded the attack. Creating the impression that Hamas was interested in stability and improving the economic situation in the Gaza Strip was part of a broader deception campaign, which involved restraint and containment and was intended to convince Israel that the organization was not interested in a confrontation. Following the massacre, senior Hamas officials also addressed elements of this deception.
In this context, and as long as the precise content of the warnings remains unknown, it is difficult to separate at least some of them from the negotiations taking place at the time and the signals Hamas itself was sending to Israel. A message originating with Sinwar, delivered amid talks over economic concessions and at a time when Hamas was applying pressure along the border, could have been interpreted in real time as part of the same strategy—certainly after the concessions were secured and the unrest subsided.
Additional information that may be published could change the picture. Transcripts of the warnings could point to a more concrete warning, particularly regarding the warning that came from Egypt and did not originate with Sinwar. Further details about the negotiations between Israel and Hamas could also paint a different picture. But at this point, it is difficult to view these warnings as a clear piece of “golden intelligence” that was missed.
The Prevailing Assumptions and Responsibility
But the main significance of the latest revelations is strategic. They reinforce the criticism of the security establishment, and particularly the political leadership, headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, over the assumptions that preceded the attack and the profound failure of October 7. They also reveal just how extensive the contacts and communication between Hamas and the Israeli government were on the eve of the massacre.
The Israeli leadership fell completely for the deception orchestrated by Hamas, interpreting the information it received within the framework that the organization itself sought to establish: that Hamas was interested in an arrangement, stability, and improving the economic situation in the Gaza Strip. The relationship that developed during Netanyahu’s years in office, a combination of short rounds of fighting, indirect negotiations, and arrangements involving money and concessions, was the framework within which the pieces of information received on the eve of the attack were also interpreted.
The view that the conflict with Hamas could be managed and relations with the organization stabilized over the long term through a civilian arrangement was deeply entrenched, and also appeared in official documents from the Prime Minister’s Office. According to the reports, Netanyahu even refrained from deciding on a proposal to eliminate senior Hamas figures on the eve of the attack. He was not merely a player within this system. He was one of its central architects.
The latest revelations also underscore how much remains unknown about the October 7 failure. Meeting minutes, decisions, and significant events at both the tactical and strategic levels have yet to be made public. In the absence of a full and systematic public inquiry, the picture is being pieced together through a drip of documents, testimonies, and briefings, each revealing only part of it.
It is possible that once the picture is more complete, it will look different from the one that has taken shape in the public consciousness so far. Until an investigative commission is established that can systematically examine all the material, information will continue to emerge piecemeal, through the parties who hold it and according to the timing they choose, rather than as part of a comprehensive public inquiry.