The Netanyahu bloc lost 11 seats in the 26th Knesset elections, but less than half of that loss can be attributed to a decline in its overall share of the national vote. The rest, according to Davar’s analysis of the election results, is mainly due to changes in the effect of the electoral threshold. In the 2022 elections, the bloc won around six seats more than its proportional share of the valid votes, whereas in the most recent elections, this advantage almost entirely disappeared.
The analysis also reveals a sharp class divide in voting patterns: the higher the socioeconomic ranking of the polling stations, the lower the support for the Netanyahu bloc. It also shows that support for the Netanyahu bloc (the parties in the current governing coalition, including the ultra-Orthodox parties) declined in all the major cities. The voting data also reveal where the seats lost by Shas went, and whether Arab voters are voting for Jewish parties and vice versa.
How Netanyahu Lost 11 Seats
In the 2022 elections, the Netanyahu bloc won 64 seats, falling to 53 in the 2026 elections. Netanyahu lost support among the Jewish electorate, but this accounts for only three of the 11 seats he lost. The increase in the share of valid votes cast at Arab polling stations accounts for a further 2.3 seats, while around 5.7 seats stem from changes mainly related to the electoral threshold.
In 2022, Meretz and Balad failed to pass the electoral threshold, and almost 300,000 votes cast for them were not translated into Knesset seats. In 2026, by contrast, the parties Am HaYisrael and Noam, which were part of the Netanyahu bloc, failed to pass the threshold, meaning that more than 100,000 votes cast for them were not translated into seats.
In this way, the Netanyahu bloc lost 11 seats, the Arab parties gained nine, and the Eisenkot bloc gained only two, since the increased share of votes cast at Arab polling stations also reduced the Eisenkot bloc’s proportional share.
Declining Support Among the Jewish Public
Although the shift in votes away from the Netanyahu bloc was not the main factor behind its loss of seats, it was a significant and consistent one. In all ten major cities, based on valid votes cast at non-Arab polling stations, the Netanyahu bloc lost support to the Change Bloc and other parties.
In the two largest cities, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the Netanyahu bloc lost 4.1% and 2.8% of support, respectively. It also lost support in its strongholds of Netanya, Ashdod and Beersheva, where it had won more than 60% of the vote in 2022. However, in these cities, the Change Bloc gained less support, while the Reservists and Economic Party gained votes instead, although it failed to pass the electoral threshold.
Across all non-Arab polling stations, the Eisenkot bloc also increased its share of the vote at Netanyahu’s expense, while the decline in support for Netanyahu was divided mainly between the Change Bloc and the Reservists-Economic Party.
Little Cross-Sector Voting
In 2022, only 7% of votes cast at polling stations in Arab localities went to non-Arab parties. In 2026, this share declined further, to 5%. The sharp increase in voter turnout in the Arab sector led to an increase in the number of seats held by the Arab parties, at the expense of both blocs.
Voting for Arab parties in Jewish localities was almost non-existent: less than 0.5% of votes were cast for Arab parties in both the 2022 and 2026 elections.
Where Did Shas’s Seats Go?
One of the biggest losers in the elections was Shas, which lost almost half of its seats in the Knesset, falling from 11 seats in the outgoing Knesset to six in the incoming one.
Davar’s analysis points to two possible sources of this loss. The first is a shift in votes within the bloc, which can be inferred from net changes in levels of support. In polling stations in non-Haredi Jewish neighbourhoods, Shas’s losses were greater where its support had been higher in 2022. The rest of the Netanyahu bloc also gained support in these areas. In non-Haredi neighbourhoods where Shas had received 15% or more of the vote, it lost 6.4%, while the rest of the bloc gained 3.8%.
The second source is the new ultra-Orthodox lists – Hatzibur HaHaredi and Tzeva Shachor – which gained support in Haredi and mixed Haredi localities. It is likely that some of their gains came from voters who had previously supported Shas. In Haredi localities, Shas’s support fell by 5.5%, while the new ultra-Orthodox parties gained 2.3% of votes. The rest of the bloc gained 2.2 percentage points.
A Clear Class-Based Voting Pattern
Clear patterns can be identified in voting in Israel according to socioeconomic class. These emerge from cross-referencing voting data with the Central Bureau of Statistics’ socioeconomic cluster map, which assigns every area in Israel, down to the neighbourhood level, to one of ten socioeconomic clusters, based on a combination of data such as income, education and standard of living.
It is important to bear in mind that, when using a breakdown by socioeconomic clusters, the number of people in each cluster is not equal (unlike, for example, a division into income deciles), and the same applies to the number of actual voters. For example, the middle clusters (4–7) account for almost half of all valid votes – roughly twice as many as the lower clusters (1–3) and higher clusters (8–10), respectively.
When Jewish polling stations are divided by socioeconomic cluster, a clear pattern emerges in voting for the two blocs. As the socioeconomic ranking rises, support for the Change Bloc increases, while support for the Netanyahu bloc declines. In clusters 1–3, support is concentrated mainly among the ultra-Orthodox parties. In cluster 7, the two blocs receive almost equal levels of support – 47.2% for the Netanyahu bloc and 47.8% for the Change Bloc. From cluster 8 upwards, the Change Bloc has the advantage.
Including all polling stations in the calculation shows that the Arab parties receive around 40% of the vote in the lower clusters (1–3), while the ultra-Orthodox parties receive around 28%. In the middle clusters (4–7), which account for around half of all valid votes, the Netanyahu bloc wins a majority with 51% of the vote. In the higher clusters, which account for around a quarter of all votes, the Change Bloc receives 70% support.
Likud Draws Its Support from the Middle Class
Which socioeconomic groups supported each party? A breakdown of voting data by socioeconomic cluster can also be used to build a socioeconomic profile of each party’s voters: how many live in areas classified in the lower clusters, compared with voters in the middle and higher clusters.
Otzma Yehudit, Religious Zionism, Yisrael Beiteinu and Likud all draw their support primarily from the middle clusters, which account for between 61% and 67% of their votes. The remaining votes for these parties are divided relatively evenly between the lower and higher clusters. Around 60% of the votes for the Reservists and Economic Party and Am HaYisrael also come from the middle clusters, but the remainder of their support is concentrated in the higher clusters (32%). Taking the size of the groups into account, support for these parties in the two groups is similar.
The Democrats, Yashar and Beyachad – three of the four parties in the Change Bloc – receive higher levels of support in the higher socioeconomic clusters than in the other clusters. For Yashar, 94% of its votes are divided equally between the middle and higher clusters. However, as noted, the middle clusters account for around half of all valid votes, compared with around a quarter in the higher clusters, indicating a much higher level of support in the higher clusters. The picture is very similar for Beyachad, while The Democrats rely even more heavily on the higher clusters, which account for 56% of their votes. Seven percent of The Democrats’ votes come from the lower clusters, mainly from Arab polling stations.
Although the Druze community accounts for only a tiny share of the total vote, the sharp shifts in voting patterns at Druze polling stations are noteworthy. In 2022, the centre-left parties – Labour, Meretz and Yesh Atid – won more than a quarter of the vote, while in 2026, The Democrats and Beyachad won only 8.5%. Support for the Arab parties also declined, from almost 10% in 2022 to 7.3% in 2026. Yashar, which won 37.9% of the vote, was the leading party. The parties that saw an increase in support compared with the previous elections were Yisrael Beiteinu, which rose from 18.2% to around a quarter of the vote, and the parties in the Netanyahu bloc, whose support increased by 7.2%.